Background
The Japanese government first proposed an "Asian Monetary Fund" (AMF) in September 1997. The original aim of an AMF was to make available a pool of funds to be quickly disbursed as a means of emergency balance of payments support for the crisis-hit economies. The proposal was enthusiastically welcomed by most East Asian economies.
While the bulk of financing would have been from Japan, it reportedly received pledges of contribution from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore 1 . Potential mobilisation capacity of an AMF was estimated to have been in the order of about US$100 billion (ADB, 1999 and Wade and Veneroso, 1998) . However, as Wade and Veneroso (1998, p.19) note, "(t)he United States Treasury pulled out all the stops to kill the proposal, and it died", as the US appeared to see it as a threat to its influence in Asia 2 .
While the proposal has entered policy debates every now and then, it made headlines recently when the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, tabled it again at an East Asian Summit organised by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Singapore. He reportedly stated that an AMF should be:
1 There is some ambiguity about the reaction of China to an AMF proposal, with the ADB (1999) and Wade and Veneroso (1998) noting that China supported the scheme, while Bergsten (1998) suggesting that it was against it. 2 The AMF proposal was rejected at the fifth APEC meeting in Manila. This is in sharp contrast to the US policy response to Mexico during the peso crisis, in which the Treasury tried to "strongarm" the IMF, Europe and Japan into contributing to the ESF (Altbach, 1997) . Some see the APEC Manila Framework as a compromise between Japan's call for greater regional cooperation and the US and the IMF's rejection of the AMF proposal. An argument has been made that the primary aim of Tokyo pushing the proposal in the first instance was to seek greater leverage within the IMF and US. These and other possible tactical and geopolitical motives and implications are well beyond the scope of the discussion in this paper.
a small compact wholly regional funding organisation which would be deeply and constantly engaged in East Asian monetary cooperation and problems on a daily basis 3 .
Most recently, ASEAN ministers mooted a version of the AMF proposal in their recent "informal" summit in Manila. The Philippines president, Joseph Estrada, made specific reference to the AMF proposal in his opening remarks to the summit. Former Japanese financial vice minister, Eisuke Sakakibara, also reignited debate on the issue, urging the creation of "credible mechanisms for regional cooperation both in trade and finance" in view of what he considered as lack of substantive progress in reforming the international financial architecture 4 .
This paper explores the case for an AMF in light of the East Asian crisis. The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the rationale for an AMF in general. Section 3 is devoted to defining and highlighting the various transmission channels through which currency and financial crises may spread contagiously. Section 4 discusses the role of such a regional facility, and attempts to clarify important issues such as its functional relationship to the IMF. The final section concludes the paper.
The Case For an AMF?
While one could find fault with the timing and manner in which Japan initially tabled the AMF proposal, this ought to be kept distinct from the question of its potential effectiveness. To be sure, one can, in general terms, think of many justifications for the initiation of such a geographically concentrated facility, some of which are noted below.
First, bailout packages in Latin America and East Asia have, by and large, been regional in any event. To be sure, half of the total US$42 billion financial assistance committed to Indonesia through the IMF was bilateral aid, of which most was by regional economies in East Asia. In the case of commitments to Thailand, about one third of the US$34 billion package was bilateral, all of which was from the regional economies. The US contributed US$5 billion to South Korea, US$3 billion to Indonesia and none to Thailand (Table 1) . Additionally, the East Asian economies such as Japan and Singapore provided other forms of bilateral assistance to the crisis-hit regional economies (Chang and Rajan, 1999) .
Insert Table 1
Second, the East Asian crisis has emphasised the existence of "demand" by key regional players for some form of a regional cooperative alliance (the obvious alternative being ad hoc unilateralism 5 ), while the potential "supply" of such a regional facility (in terms of resource availability) seems in little doubt.
Third, there are pre-existing channels and organisations in East Asia and elsewhere which promote regional economic cooperation in other spheres, with the monetary facility being a "natural" intensification of such efforts.
Fourth, there may be a need for some sort of geographically concentrated facility which allows the regional economies to work in concert to gain a larger voice in 5 Malaysia's recent unilateral imposition of capital restraints is an obvious case in point. See for a discussion of capital restraints in general, and the Malaysian case in particular.
international monetary affairs, as has been quite successfully achieved in the case of global trade. Apart from Indonesia, no other ASEAN economy has been included in the G-20 finance ministers forum recently formed to look into issues regarding the shaping of the international financial architecture, as they were considered "systematically unimportant countries" (Rowley, 1999) 6 .
Fifth, Asia possesses neither a strong regional hegemon nor a regional monetary institution 7 . In contrast, the US has provided the necessary economic and financial leadership in the Americas (and is even seen as the region's de facto regional lender of last resort), while monetary integration has been successfully attained in Europe.
Sixth, regardless of the exact transmission mechanisms and definitions, it is clear that economic policy slippages in any one economy can and do reverberate rapidly to other economies in the region in the form of contagious currency crises, with consequent detrimental effects on the real economies. Proponents of regionalism in the macroeconomic and financial spheres emphasise "contagion" effects as providing the analytical basis for some broader form of economic cooperation regionally. As such, the next section is devoted to exploring this issue in some detail.
"Regional Contagion": Definitions and Transmission Channels
The currency crises of the 1990s stress the importance of contagion or negative spillover effects that are largely regional in scope (consequently, also referred to as "neighbourhood effects"). This being said, contagion could, at times, take on a global 6 Other members of the G-20 forum are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey; the G-7 group of industrialised economies (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the US). The EU and IMF are also participants. 7 There are, of course, historical reasons for the failure of Japan to accept or be accepted as a dimension. A good instance of this was the across-the-board rise in emerging market risk premia and bond spreads following the Russian sovereign debt default in August 1998 (BIS, 1999 found that contagion is directly dependent on geographical horizon, i.e.
there are strong "neighbourhood effects". Krueger et al (1998) , using a panel of annual data for 19 developing economies for the period 1977-93, concluded that a currency crisis in a regional economy raises the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 8.5 percent points 8 .
Broadly, "contagion" refers to the simultaneous occurrence of currency crises in two or more economies.. It may be more formally defined as a situation where a currency crisis in one economy leads to a jump to a "bad" equilibrium in a neighbouring economy (Masson, 1998) 9 . In other words, While there is a need to be very precise in defining the term "currency crisis" in empirical analyses, we take it here to broadly involve an actual break of an exchange rate peg and concomitant currency depreciation, or speculative pressure which may not lead to an exchange rate depreciation, but does lead to an regional economic hegemon. 8 Other recent empirical studies confirming this regional dimension of currency crises include Calvo and Reinhart (1996) , Frankel and Schmukler (1996) , Glick and Rose (1999) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999a) .
9 Some have referred to contagion as an increase in asset price volatility across countries.
Though not often done in the literature, strictly speaking, one ought also to distinguish carefully between "mild contagion" (that may be defined as "an overall increase in risk premia") and "strong contagion" (that may be defined as "a severe speculative attack"). As emphasised by Willett (1999) , while there is evidence of mild contagion, the existence of contagion of the strong variety is far from obvious.
international reserve depletion or an interest rate hike. 
Exploring the Transmission Channels
What are the channels which cause the contagious spread of crises? Five possible modes of transmission may be deciphered.
The first, and most direct, is the need to remain "cost competitive" vis-à-vis other economies with similar areas of comparative advantage, as a real devaluation in one economy enhances its export competitiveness at the expense of a trading partner (regional competitor). Gerlach and Smets (1995) , Huh and Kasa (1997) and Corsetti, et al. (1998b) formalise the logic of this attack-induced competitive devaluation (i.e. regional economies' competitiveness vis-à-vis third markets as a result of currency depreciations) 11 .
Second, in contrast to contagion due to the "competition" noted above, there may 10 Empirical work by Park and Song (1999) suggests that contagion spread from Taiwan (following the preemptive devaluation of the New Taiwan dollar in October) to Hong Kong and South Korea, which then reverberated back to Southeast Asia. 11 The broad similarity of comparative advantages of the East Asian economies has been shown to hold, at least ex-post (as measured by the index of revealed comparative advantage) (Kellman and Chow 1993 reasons. These include, an anticipation of increased redemptions; the need to cover losses in other crisis-hit markets ("cash-in" effects); and in order to reduce portfolio risks and improve the liquidity position ("flight to safety" effects) 13 . Of particular significance is the contagious transmission of crises through the interbank lending channel as 12 Ng and Yeats (1999) provide new statistics detailing the extent of such intraregional production and trade in component manufacturing parts in East Asia. Intraregional investment has also been spurred by Singapore's drive in recent years to build the external dimension of its economy to complement and supplement the domestic economy.
13 See Calvo (1999) for a model involving two sets of agents (informed and uninformed), in which margin calls necessitate asset sales in one economy following price declines in another. FolkertsLandau and Garber (1998) stress risk control systems as a possible reason for region-wide asset sell-offs and resultant contagion; while Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) emphasise the value at risk (VAR) technique in particular. However, Schinasi and Todd Smith (1999) show such financial contagion could result from normal/textbook portfolio diversification rules, with risk management techniques and rules not having any significantly different consequences on optimal sell-off periods/strategies. Baig and Goldfajn (1998) test for evidence of contagion in the exchange rates, interest rates, equity, and sovereign debt markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines. They find that while sovereign spreads show clear evidence of contagion (of the weak form), the same cannot be said of the regional equity markets.
emphasised by Eichengreen (1999) and Van Ricjkegham and Weder (1999) 14 .
Fourth, many extra-regional investors, such as mutual funds and even foreign banks, tend to lump economies in the non-industrialised world into sub-regions, rather than make country-specific evaluations and investments 15 . Insofar as the entire geographical region is looked upon as a single investment class (i.e. "risk clusters") rather than as individual markets, a weakness or attack on one currency could lead to a reassessment of the region's "fundamentals" and the probability of a similar fate befalling regional economies with broadly similar macroeconomic stances (whether actual or perceived). This is popularly termed the "wake-up call" effect. Alternatively, this phenomenon may also refer to the sudden realisation of how little market participants truly understood about the regional economies, leading to a region-wide downgrading/sell-off (Radelet and Sachs, 1998a) . Drazen (1998) develops a contagion model which is based on economies being in an implicit or explicit currency/monetary union. Thus, a devaluation by one economy acts as a wake up call to investors in the sense that it leads them to question the commitment of other regional economies to maintain "club membership" by not devaluing. Dooley (1998) suggests that the "bunching together" of crises may be due to revisions in the effective size of official lines of credit available to the regional governments to defend the currency (either from international agencies or ad hoc bilateral, multilateral agreements). The important point here is that unlike the mechanistic portfolio rebalancing behaviour noted previously, in this case, there do not have to exist any actual linkages between the emerging markets (discussed further below).
Fifth, there is also the possibility of "panic herding" ("bandwagon" effects), either in the form of an international bank run (i.e. "race to the exits") leading to illiquidity a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) Of importance is that fact that there are a wide variety of models and cases which could lead to rational herding. In other words, one does not have to appeal to investor irrationality to motivate panic withdrawals, acute market volatility and busts.
An important agenda for empirical research is how relevant the various causes of contagion were in the case of the East Asian crisis. In a recent study using a comprehensive data set of financial statistics, product information, geographic data, and stock returns involving 14,000 companies in 46 economies, Forbes (1999) found that all the above transmission mechanisms were important in the case of the East Asian crisis, particularly the product competitiveness channel. Liu et al. (1998) have also provided empirical support for this product competitiveness channel in the case of the ASEAN economies. A priori, it is surprising that the common creditor/credit crunch effect (through banks) was not found to be as important. However, this may be explained by the fact that Forbes focused on international rather than regional propagation, and did not test for the herding channel. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999a) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) have concluded that the bank lender channel was
Asian Tigers Fund and others. See Frankel and Schlumker (1996) for a list of such Asia-based funds.
particularly important in the East Asian crisis, though the inclusion of a trade competition variable tends to dilute their significance, due possibly to the high correlation between competition for funds and trade. This result is not inconsistent with Glick and Rose (1999) , who have suggested that trade is an important channel for regional contagion.
"Pure Contagion", Interdependencies and Common Shocks
A distinction should be made between transmission channels that are related to investor sentiment or psychology (termed "pure contagion") and linkages between countries that are measurable/observable ex-ante (referred to as "spillovers" or "interrelatedness"). Common external shocks that impact all regional economies may be termed "monsoonal" effects (Masson, 1998) . Thus, in the case of East Asia, a number of common shocks have been suggested. For instance, Eichengreen (1999) has emphasised the anticipated rise in Japanese short-term interest rates in the Spring of 1997 as being the trigger to a fall in regional capital flows; McKibbin (1998) stresses the role of the US interest rate hike in late March 1997 and subsequent drop in the US stock market; yet others such as the World Bank (1999) and have stressed the sharp export growth slowdown in East Asia as being among the proximate external triggers of the crisis. Others have suggested the steep appreciation of the Japanese yen vis-à-vis the US$ and the consequent trade-weighted real appreciations of the regional currencies as being an important common external shock 17 .
and Velasco (1998, 1999) for open economy extensions of the Diamond-Dybvig framework of payoff externalities. 17 Another common shock often suggested has been the devaluation of the Chinese renminbi (of about 35 percent) against the US$ in 1994 (see, for instance, Makin, 1997) . The importance of this episode is very questionable, as the devaluation was on the official rate, while most of the transactions were being carried out at the unofficial/market rate. Indeed, the primary aim of the devaluation seems to have been to bring the official rate in line with the unofficial one, rather than
Masson (1998) shows how it is conceptually possible for "pure contagion" to make an economy relatively more vulnerable to a currency crisis. To be sure, he notes that:
pure contagion is only possible if changes in expectations are selffulfilling, and this requires that financial markets be subject to multiple equilibra..(and)…(e)ven if each country separately is not subject to multiple equilibra, together they may be, since the fear of crisis in one will increase the devaluation probability in the other, making a crisis more likely in both.
The important point here is that there must exist a range or zone of weakness within which a currency is potentially vulnerable to a speculative attack in the first instance, with pure contagion increasing the zone of vulnerability. This is consistent with the escape clause based (ECB) second generation currency crises models pioneered by Obstfeld (1994) , of which contagion models are a subset 18 . All ECB second generation models exhibit certain basic traits, which include the following: (a) there is a reason why the government is tempted to abandon the prevailing peg 19 ; (b) there is a reason why the government would like to hang on to the fixed exchange rate. -Thus, there is a tension between motives (a) and (b). The decision regarding the abandonment of the peg is policy-determined, as an optimising policy-maker balances the various tradeoffs -; and (c) there exist two or more equilibra corresponding to various magnitudes of the postcrisis depreciation.
All ECB models stress that while speculative attacks are not inevitable (on the a mercantilist policy per se. Fernald et al. (1998 ), Liu et al. (1998 and Zhang (1998) discuss this issue in detail.
basis of underlying "fundamentals") 20 , neither are they arbitrary, random or undiscriminating (i.e. unanchored by fundamentals). Rather, there must exist some weaknesses in the economic fundamentals of the economy for an attack to occur, as the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime is less than perfect. If the economy's fundamentals are either very "good" or very "bad", it will respectively never or always be attacked. Within those two extremes -which imply unique equilibrium (i.e. an attack with close to 0 or 1 probabilities) -there is an intermediate range (grey area). Within this "crisis zone", there may exist some weaknesses in the economy that are neither strong enough to completely preclude a speculative attack on the currency, nor sufficiently weak to make an attack altogether unavoidable. Rather, there are a multiplicity of equilibra such that an economy remains on what seems to be a sustainable path ("superior equilibrium"), until some trigger or evidently minor event coalesces market expectations to an "inferior" equilibrium that is realised.
Thus, shifts in market sentiments could lead to jumps between one equilibra to the other, consequently introducing sharp volatility in financial markets. Theoretically, anything can act as the coordinating device leading to a jump from a "good" to "bad" equilibra. For instance, a devaluation in one country could lead to a major downward spiralling of the currency and the domestic economy (given high interest rate policy and/or unhedged foreign currency liabilities of the country), or precipitate depreciations in regional countries (i.e. contagion).
assuming that the "policy maker" or "government" is a monolithic body. 20 There is no firm consensus yet as to what these "fundamentals" are. However, empirical analyses have found that the strength of the domestic financial/banking sector; the extent of lending booms; the degree of currency overvaluation; and the size and maturity structure of external debt are among the most important variables to be concerned about (see, for instance, Krueger et al., 1998 and Tornell, 1999) . De Gregario and find that the likelihood of a contagious attack is inversely related to the average debt maturity structure.
Against this analytical background, it is revealing to note that in almost all crises experiences, the economies initially and worst affected by the crises were also the ones with the worst fundamentals to begin with. On the other hand, even the strongest regional economies can be and have been affected by weaknesses in neighbouring economies because of trade and financial interdependencies. Thus, the term contagion is quite apt, because, like a spreading virus, agents with the weakest immune system to begin with, are the ones most severely impacted. Table 2 in the case of the East Asian crisis nicely illustrates this point. It is fairy clear that, by most counts, Thailand had the worst "fundamentals", followed by Indonesia, which was the most severely impacted by the crisis. Hong Kong and Singapore, which seem to have had the best fundamentals, were the least affected, while
Malaysia and the Philippines were somewhere "in between". On the other hand, even the strongest regional economies can be and have been affected by weaknesses in neighbouring economies because of trade and financial interdependencies 21 .
Insert Table 2 4.
Key Issues Relating to an AMF
Regardless of the exact transmission mechanisms and definitions, the important message that emanates from the previous section is that economic policy slippages in any one economy can and do reverberate rapidly to other economies in the region in the form of contagious currency crises, with consequent detrimental effects on the real economies 22 . As noted, this in turn provides the analytical basis for some sort of regional 21 Similarly, in the case of the Tequila crisis, Chile, which was acknowledged to be by far the strongest regional economy in Latin America, was relatively unaffected. 22 It is easy to show how an initial devaluation could actually prove to be contractionary in the facility to deal with these contagious effects. In the case of Asia, this brings us back to the AMF proposal. There are at least three important questions that need to be sorted out with regard to an AMF.
First, would such a facility be focussed on crisis prevention, i.e. assisting in the defence of a regional currency under speculative pressures (pre-crisis) and temporary international payments imbalances, or crisis management and resolution, i.e. assisting in the recovery and restructuring process (post-crisis)? There may, in fact, be sound rationale for the inclusion of Hong Kong, Taiwan and India, along with Australia. For instance, Taiwan has one of the largest aggregate short and medium terms, with the domestic financial and corporate sectors caught in a downward spiral, leading to a sharp discrete decline in the domestic currency following the initial breakdown of the exchange rate peg. This point is developed within a simple "bank-centred" Mundell-Fleming framework .
reserve holdings in the world, and is closely interlinked with the ASEAN and other East Asian economies. Along with Singapore, Hong Kong (the other regional financial center)
has been included as a member of the "Financial Stability Forum" established in early 1999. As India continues to liberalise its economy in a considered manner, it is expected to be among the fastest growing economies in the world. India has been included in the previously noted G-20 forum (fn 6). Australia too is a member of the G-20 forum, and has been fairly proactive in the region, with assistance from Ausaid helping establish the Asian Recovery Information Centre (ARIC) (launched in November 1999). The intention of the ARIC is to consolidate all information (mainly data) on the economies most directly impacted by the regional crisis. Both Hong Kong and Australia have contributed to the IMF support packages (Table 1) . Australia has also provided other forms of technical assistance to the crisis-hit economies. In the end, however, membership is going to be determined at least partly by geopolitical considerations and biases rather than pure economic rationale. This being the case, let us focus on the first two issues in the remainder of this section.
Exploring Possible Roles For an AMF
It is envisaged that the IMF's role should be primarily one of crisis management and resolution (see discussion in next subsection), while the comparative advantage of an AMF would be in crisis prevention, something that the region has under-invested in. An AMF would be responsible for coming to the aid of regional currencies that may be susceptible to speculative pressures. However, in order to be an effective deterrent against such attacks (i.e. monetary defence mechanisms), the monetary facility must be "fairly large", with appropriate contributions from member economies. Ability to access this pool of funds and reduce moral hazard concerns (due to ready availability of "easy/cheap money") ought to be conditional on/tied to member economies maintaining some pre-determined standards of macroeconomic and financial stability. In addition, if and when necessary, the members must be willing to subject themselves to regional peer pressure to undertake necessary policy adjustments. Needless to say, promotion of policy dialogue will be a key function of such a facility.
Institutional and operational details regarding such a facility and terms of lending would need to be worked out in detail. Broadly, following Bagehot (1853), lending must be "automatic", "sufficient" "expensive" (i.e. "penalty rate" over the market or normal lending rates) and relatively short term, so as to maintain the subtle but critical balance between establishing market confidence, on the one hand, while preventing "excessive" moral hazard from developing, on the other.
Obviously, such macro-cum-prudential oversight needs to be accompanied by both peer review and an effective regional surveillance process-cum-early warnings system. Ideally, such a system should track national, regional and international macroeconomic developments; pay attention to regional policy interdependence; and facilitate necessary policy corrections in a timely manner when necessary. As noted by the IMF's first deputy managing director, Stanley Fischer (1999), "(s)urveillance and policy coordination at regional levels can help reduce the risk of future crises and promote regional dynamism." Similarly, the OECD is responsible for surveillance of its members. Seen in this light, one could easily envisage the recently established ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) being expanded to include the other members of the regional facility, and possibly even being housed in the latter (Chang and Rajan, 1999) .
The AMF-IMF Nexus (Globalism versus Regionalism?)
The assumption -indeed, hope -is that, with a credible and well-funded regional body which focuses on crisis prevention, and does so effectively, there may be less need to be concerned about resolution (post-crisis) issues and strategies. As noted, this in turn ought to allow for a fairly clear demarcation of the roles of the international and regional monetary fund. But does it? In actuality, two factors complicate the seemingly clear division of labour as suggested above. First, it is important to clarify the appropriate role for a regional facility during the time of crisis management and resolution vis-à-vis the IMF. Second, the IMF has, in recent times, significantly expanded its role from a crisis manager to one of a crisis preventor.
Crisis Management and Resolution
One envisages that the regional monetary facility could act as the coordinating regional body to work with the IMF, World Bank and ADB to raise and channel funds to the crisis-hit economies and serve as a single, coherent voice as to the "appropriate" policy conditionalities to be implemented. The facility could also help coordinate bilateral aid initiatives such as the New Miyazawa Initiative and ensure timely aid disbursements (which was a key issue in the crisis) 24 . The regional body would play a major role in suggesting the appropriateness of various policies/conditionalities, given its knowledge of regional circumstances 25 . This ought to sharply reduce any criticisms about the international agencies not being aware or mindful of region-specific factors when prescribing policies. This in turn should mitigate feelings of the conditionalities having been "imposed externally", without paying sufficient attention to regional sensitivities and circumstances.
While there ought to be no question of conditional lending by the regional facility being undertaken with the IMF, there is the important issue of whether it should be done through the IMF. Bergsten (1998) suggests that the two should be done distinctly, with the amounts being agreed upon in advance with the AMF. This is to ensure that the supplementary regional funding is not limited by the IMF's systems of quotas for individual economies. Radelet and Sachs (1998b) have suggested that the "arrival of the IMF gives all the confidence of seeing an ambulance outside one's door". If so, from a "credibility"
perspective, there would seem to be a need for the IMF to work in tandem with a strong regional body during future crises. This is particularly so, given that restoration of "market confidence" has been among the stated goals of IMF conditionalities in East Asia 26 .
Crisis Prevention
25 Lest it is misunderstood, what we have in mind here is that the regional body will discuss/debate these issues with the IMF, but will do so behind closed doors. The conditionalities so arrived at must be articulated with one voice and without any ambiguity (unlike the open debate in the case of the World Bank and the IMF during the early stages of the East Asian crisis).
The IMF has historically been seen as playing a major role in helping member economies overcome balance of payments crises through conditional lending 27 . However, the IMF has always had a key role to play in surveillance of the economic situations of member countries, and has promoted the adoption of sound domestic macroeconomic and financial policies (IMF, 1999a) . One could easily envisage the IMF lending its experience and expertise to regional bodies such as an AMF in these crisis prevention areas, and continuing to provide training and technical assistance for capacity building. The Thai case has highlighted the limitations of IMF surveillance, in that it is neither able to publicise the annual Article IV country analysis of economic policies without the government's permission 28 , nor does there exist any enforcement mechanism to ensure governments pursue sustainable growth policies. A compact regional facility must be given the mandate to force member countries to take appropriate actions if domestic weaknesses and imbalances are apparent (i.e. the facility must have teeth).
Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs)
Following the Mexican-Tequila and East Asian crisis, the IMF has rapidly expanded its crisis prevention role by establishing a new lending facility called the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) in April 1999. The CCL is aimed at those countries which the IMF views as being potential "innocent victims" of contagion effects, but otherwise have "sound" domestic policies 29 . This is in addition to the Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF) established in December 1997 to aid emerging market economies faced with crises of confidence 30 . However, these crises-loans by the IMF have come under attack by some, who have emphasised the possibility of them engendering moral hazard.
Others have argued that there is an absence of clear guidelines as to the terms and conditions that would apply to the new facility. Accordingly, it is sometimes charged that the ultimate decision would largely be political, based on the strategic/security objectives of the most important member, the US, which holds a disproportionate influence over the institution (and has a de facto veto power). In this light, an argument may be made that the countries in the Americas (Mexico in particular), extra-regional countries that are OECD members (such as Korea), or of strategic importance (such as Russia), will always be given "preference" over other emerging economies.
Indeed, an Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial
Architecture recently recommended outright abolishment of the CCL and SRF programs and a significant reduction in "extraordinary" IMF lending more generally (so as to reduce the moral hazard problems). They argued the operational guidelines for qualification for a CCL are "unnecessarily complex", and there is no "new money" set aside for a CCL (Hill et al., 1999) . In relation to this, questions have been raised regarding whether the scale of funding through a CCL is sufficient to be effective. In particular, disbursement of CCL funding is based on a range of 300-500 percent over a member's quota with the IMF. Taking even the higher figure and using data as of April 1999, this implies that South Korea and Thailand were eligible to receive US$11 billion 30 The SRF is meant for countries already facing a crisis, while the CCL is meant to be disbursed prior to a crisis (precautionary). Lending terms are similar, with the cost of credit being 300 basis points (bps) above the IMF's normal lending, with additional penalties every six months to a and US$7.4 billion, respectively (Davitte, 1999) . These figures pale in comparison to the actual commitments to the two countries (Table 1) .
The Task Force did recognise the existence of contagion and the need for some sort of facility to deal with the problem. According to them, such a facility should work in association with the IMF but not actually be part of IMF's lending facility (Hill et al., 1999) . They further argued that only countries affected by "systematic crises" or episodes of contagion ought to be provided the funding, which should be disbursed quickly and be heavily front-loaded. Since the Task Force recommended the CCL be funded by the members donating their respective shares of SDR allocation of the facility as start up capital, they argued this would make it less susceptible to moral hazard (members not contributing their own money) 31 .
What they failed to consider, however, was the alternative of having a regional facility to deal with these issues. Indeed, as long as the focus is on crisis prevention, there is no reason why the task should not fall on a regional facility such as an AMF, with important technical expertise provided by the IMF. Arguably, a well-funded regional facility (as opposed to an insufficiently funded, administratively constrained international facility?) will be better able to disburse funds more quickly to its members when the need arises.
The resources of the regional body can be further consolidated if it negotiates guaranteed lines of credit with private banks on behalf of its member economies in times of distress. This is not unlike the Argentine arrangement, in which the country has maximum of 500 bps (Davitte, 1999 and IMF, 1999b) . 31 In any case, moral hazard is far more of a concern on the side of the (private) lenders than it is on the side of (sovereign) borrowers. Accordingly, what are needed are initiatives that ensure some kind of "appropriate burden sharing" between both parties. By creditors also taking a entered into an agreement in December 1996 with a group of 13 foreign banks to lend Argentina up to US$6.1 billion against collateral at a premium over the LIBOR rate for a certain "commitment fee". In the case of East Asia, a large part of the lending pre-crisis was by regional -mainly Japanese -banks (Chang and Rajan, 1999) 32 . Thus, a regional facility ought, presumably, to have greater "leverage" over the private banking community and be able to play a more effective coordinating role between them and regional members. Constant surveillance by the regional member economies would allow the regional facility to better distinguish between "systematic" versus "non-systematic" crises as stressed by the Task Force.
The emphasis on sound domestic economic policies and a regional approach to crisis prevention is consistent with the spirit of "subsidiarity" emphasised by the IMF Managing Director, Michel Camadessus (1999) . By this, he means that "authorities must…become accustomed to acting at the world level only if national or regional action is not sufficient" (emphasis added). Such a regional facility would also help alleviate the liquidity problems that exist within the IMF. Consequently, this would allow it to refocus efforts on medium and longer term structural adjustment lending through the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) (renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), as well as joint strategies with the World Bank to reduce world-wide poverty through the Heavily Indebted Poorest Countries (HIPCs) initiative and related ones (Camdessus, 1999) . The appropriate focus/objectives of the IMF is by no means an uncontroversial issue. For instance, the US Treasury "haircut", this ought to help ensure that some degree of investor discipline is maintained. 32 See Peek and Rosengren (1998) for a detailed discussion of Japanese bank lending to ASEAN during the crisis period. Also see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , who rightly emphasise that the sharp escalation in bank lending to East Asia just prior to the crisis was largely due to European secretary, Lawrence Summers, has urged the IMF to focus less on medium and long-term finance and more so on crisis prevention and emergency finance (Financial Times, December 15, 1999) . This view is not surprising, as the US is not in favour of regional facilities (at least not in Asia), as noted previously. However, Summers did highlight two important points in reaching his conclusion, viz. that contagion is an important phenomenon, and that IMF funding is very limited. It is for these very reasons that this paper has argued in favour of an AMF.
Concluding Remarks
To recap, available evidence stresses that contagion is largely a regional phenomenon. As noted, it has become legion in the economics literature to separate transmission channels that cause crises to be contagious across countries into two categories. Those that are related to investor sentiment or psychology are termed "pure contagion". Those that are based on linkages between countries that are measurable/observable pre-crisis, are referred to as "spillovers" or "interdependencies"
(these could be due to trade, direct investment or financial linkages).
Both theory and evidence suggest that pure contagion is not necessarily random or arbitrary. Thus, in the case of the East Asian crisis, it is notable that the countries initially and worst-impacted were the ones with the "worst economic fundamentals" to begin with. Stronger, though much more open and regionally integrated economies (such as Singapore), were much less affected. This underscores the need for the primary focus to be placed squarely on the domestic policy arena. In the East Asian context, this broadly involves strengthening the financial systems and corporate and industrial banks.
structures. However, given the fact that regional spillovers or interdependencies are fairly high and growing in East Asia, even relatively strong regional economies can be and have been affected by crises in the weaker neighbouring economies. These policy externalities suggest the need for some form of regional cooperation in the financial and macroeconomic spheres.
Some might argue that pure contagion would be less important in the future, as investors seem to have differentiated between the regional economies following the crisis (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999) . This view is clearly debatable. In any case, indications are that countries in the region will be more susceptible to the fundamentals of the neighbouring ones, as the stronger economies like Singapore, have sharply escalated their investments in economies such as Thailand, where asset prices remain depreciated 33 . In other words, regional interdependencies can be expected to rise significantly in the future.
In light of this, it has been suggested that there may be merit in considering the creation of some sort of self-standing regional facility in Asia with limited membership (at least initially). It has been noted that the facility should focus primarily on crisis surveillance and prevention at a regional level; while the IMF continues to focus on surveillance at a global level, as well as crisis management and resolution. Any funds dispersed through the regional facility during a crisis period would be done in full consultation with the IMF and in conjunction with the potential recipient pursuing the IMF conditionalities. (Moreno, 1997) . These creditor regional economies also attempted to help defend the Thai baht for some period before the Bank of Thailand succumbed to the speculative pressures. Consideration might be given the expansion of the EMEAP (in both functional terms as well as membership) rather than create an entirely new institution.
Finally, it has sometimes been suggested that regional monetary facilities could complement the IMF in a similar way that regional development banks (such as the ADB) complement the World Bank's operations 34 . As such, it seems only appropriate to conclude with the ADB's view of an AMF proposal as expressed in the latest Asian Development Outlook (1999):
(The) AMF could play a potentially important role as a complement to the IMF in providing funds to crisis-affected countries and developing an early warning system. The implementation of such regional institutions as the AMF as part of the newly emerging financial architecture will help both to enhance the efficiency of global financial markets and to minimise systematic risk. less the average change (%) previous three years; f) June 1997; g) unclear from source, but probably average of 1996 and 1997; h) 1997 estimates; i) May 1996; j) growth of credit to private sector relative to nominal GDP, 1996; k) June 1997; I) June 1997; m) equal weights to all fundamentals (including two others included in original sources); n) greater weights given to fundamentals in which Thailand is weakest Source: Goldstein and Hawkins (1998) 
